Age Structure

A fall in current fertility changes the number of babies born now and in the future. It does not remove children who were born in earlier years. If earlier birth rates were high, the country may already have a large group of children who will remain in school age for several years. Schools must continue serving these existing cohorts even while the number of new entrants gradually begins to decline.

Option A is correct because education demand depends strongly on the age structure, not only on the latest birth rate. The effects of falling fertility appear with a time lag as smaller cohorts reach school age. Lower fertility cannot instantly reduce the number of existing children, and elderly people do not normally determine primary school demand. Thus planning must consider both current enrolment and expected future cohorts.

A population pyramid with a narrow base usually shows low fertility and a relatively small number of children. A very broad middle indicates that many people are in the working-age groups. In the near future, this large group will need opportunities to work productively. Education and training that match available and emerging occupations can help turn the age structure into an economic advantage.

Therefore, employment and skill development should become an important policy priority. New primary schools and infant nutrition are essential where children are numerous, but a narrow base means they are not the most immediate broad priority here. Elderly homes may become more important later as the large middle group ages, but the near-term signal points most strongly to jobs and skills. Thus A is correct.

A population pyramid’s base represents the youngest age groups and recent births, while its middle represents people of working age. A very narrow base means that relatively few children are being born and that new cohorts are small. The broad middle may support the country’s workforce today, but those people will gradually move into older age groups. If small child cohorts follow them, fewer people will replace retiring workers in the future.

As a result, the future working-age population may become smaller, so option A is correct. This pattern does not mean that the child population must double or that fertility will automatically rise. It may eventually increase the pressure of old-age dependency rather than always reduce it. The conclusion concerns a likely demographic challenge based on cohort movement, not an immediate change in the present workforce.

The working-age group makes up 62 percent of the population, while all dependent groups together make up 38 percent. Since 62 is greater than 38, the working-age population is larger than the combined population of children and older dependents. This is the direct comparison required by the data.

Therefore, option A is correct. The figures also give a simple dependency relationship: for every 38 dependent people in the stated shares, there are 62 people in the working-age group. This may provide a favourable demographic structure, but it does not guarantee economic success. Employment, productivity, education, health, and the ability of the economy to support workers also matter. The data do not show that all dependents are elderly.

A stable total population describes the total number of people, not the fixed size of every age group. Birth rates, death rates, survival, and ageing can change the composition even when the total remains nearly unchanged. If older people become a larger percentage, the percentages of younger people, working-age people, or both must together become smaller, because all age-group shares add up to 100 percent.

Option A is correct because the relative share of younger or working-age groups may decline as the elderly share rises. The word “relative” is important: a group could remain numerically stable or even grow while becoming a smaller percentage of the total. The other options incorrectly assume that a stable total prevents demographic change. Therefore, option A follows from the meaning of population shares.

Age dependency compares people who are commonly dependent, such as children and older adults, with people in the working-age group. When many young workers leave an origin area, the number of working-age residents falls. Older people may remain behind because they are less able or less likely to migrate. As a result, the number of elderly people per working-age person can rise, so elderly dependency may increase. Option A correctly describes this process.

This does not mean that every older person remains or that the elderly population must grow in absolute numbers. The key change may be in the ratio: the denominator, the working-age group, becomes smaller while the elderly group remains fairly stable. Out-migration therefore can alter age structure even without changing births or deaths immediately. It does not automatically reduce the elderly population, have no effect on age composition, or make child dependency zero. Hence option A is the balanced conclusion.

Young workers generally belong to the working-age population. If many of them move into a destination area, they add directly to that age group. Consequently, the destination may have a larger working-age share and a bigger potential labour force compared with its child and elderly groups. This is a possible effect, not an unavoidable result in every situation, so option A is correctly worded.

The actual outcome can also depend on the migrants’ exact ages, the number of children or older people who accompany them, and later migration or births. Nevertheless, the arrival of a large group of young adults normally increases the working-age population first. It does not necessarily double elderly dependency, make children immediately disappear, or leave age structure unchanged. The other choices use absolute or compulsory language that is not justified. Therefore, option A is the most reasonable demographic conclusion.

The population as a whole represents 100 percent. Children and elderly people are commonly treated as dependent age groups, while the remaining share belongs to the working-age group. To find that remaining share, add the two dependent groups and subtract their total from 100 percent.

Children account for 20 percent and elderly people also account for 20 percent. Their combined share is \(20+20=40\) percent. Therefore, the working-age share is \(100-40=60\) percent. This makes option C correct. The calculation assumes that the three stated age groups together cover the entire population without overlap or a missing category.

The working-age population and the dependent population are both given as 50 percent of the total population. Since the two percentages are equal, the two groups have equal shares. The dependency ratio, calculated as dependents divided by the working-age population and multiplied by 100, would be \(50/50\times100=100\). In simple terms, there are 100 dependents for every 100 working-age people, based on the stated percentages.

Option A is correct because it directly describes the equality of the two shares. The information does not tell us how the dependent group is divided between children and older people. Therefore, it cannot prove that there are no elderly people, nor can it show that one group is twice the other. Equal percentages also do not mean that each individual worker supports one particular dependent; they describe population proportions, not personal financial arrangements.

The base of a population pyramid represents the youngest age groups, while the middle generally represents adults and people of working age. A broad base therefore suggests that many children are present, often because fertility has been relatively high. A broad middle suggests that the adult or working-age population is also large.

When both sections are broad, the country can have large numbers of children as well as adults. This may result from past high fertility, population momentum, or several large cohorts moving upward through the age structure. It does not indicate that only older people are numerous, that fertility is zero, or that workers are absent. Thus, option A is the possible situation shown by the pyramid.

A population pyramid with a broad top represents a large proportion of older people, while a very narrow base represents relatively few children and low recent fertility. This combination indicates an ageing and possibly shrinking population. The small younger cohorts will eventually replace the current working-age population, but they may not be numerous enough to do so fully.

As a result, employers may face a smaller supply of workers, while the number of elderly people needing support remains high. The working population may have to support more older dependants through taxes, pensions, health services, and care systems. A narrow base does not indicate high child dependency or a very youthful population. Therefore, choice A identifies the likely future problem.

Age groups reflect the birth history of earlier years, not only current fertility. If many children were born during a period of high fertility, that large cohort will later move into the adolescent and young-adult groups. When fertility subsequently falls, fewer new children enter the youngest group, so the child share can decline. However, the earlier large cohort remains visible among young people for many years.

Option A is correct because it explains this time lag between lower fertility and changes in the youth population. Option B is wrong because low fertility does not immediately remove people who were already born. Option C confuses elderly people with youth, and D ignores the strong connection between births and age structure. Population composition therefore changes gradually as cohorts move through age groups.

A large working-age population can support production and reduce dependency for a period, but it does not remain in that age group forever. As this cohort grows older, many people will move into the elderly category. If the younger cohorts behind them are smaller, the proportion of elderly people and the burden of elderly dependency can rise in the long run. Choice A correctly describes this demographic shift.

The result is not that child dependency must double or that the working-age group will always remain large. Nor will the elderly population automatically decline merely because it is currently smaller. Fertility, survival, migration, and the size of later cohorts all influence the final outcome. The key reasoning is that today’s large adult cohort becomes tomorrow’s older cohort, creating future pension, health-care, and care pressures.

Dependent groups are people commonly counted as children and older adults for age-dependency analysis. They are considered dependent because they are generally outside the main working-age group, although individuals may differ in their actual work or support needs. The dependent share is found by adding the child share and the elderly share, not by using the working-age percentage.

Children account for 24 percent and elderly people account for 10 percent. Therefore, the combined dependent share is \(24+10=34\) percent. The remaining 66 percent is the working-age group, and the complete distribution checks because \(34+66=100\). Thus option B is correct. Option A counts only children and leaves out the elderly, while option C incorrectly adds the working-age group to the dependents.

A declining child population and a growing working-age population create a favourable demographic window, but they do not automatically create economic growth. The larger working-age group must be able to participate productively in the economy. This requires good schooling, relevant vocational and technical skills, adequate health, equal opportunity, and enough decent jobs.

Productive employment is especially important because otherwise a large working-age population may remain unemployed or underemployed. In that situation, the potential demographic dividend can be lost and may create social and economic pressure instead. High unemployment, low education, and poor health services work against the dividend rather than supporting it. Therefore, choice A gives the necessary additional condition.

The base of a population pyramid represents the youngest age groups. If it becomes narrower continuously for twenty years, fewer children have been entering each successive cohort, usually because fertility has declined. After enough time passes, these smaller cohorts move upward through the age structure and begin to enter working ages. Therefore, the number of new people entering the labour force may become smaller, making option A correct.

This conclusion concerns the size of future cohorts, not an exact prediction of employment or total population. Migration, mortality, and changes in fertility could modify the final result, but the cohort effect remains important. A narrowing base does not imply that child population must double or that fertility will become very high. Elderly dependency may eventually rise as smaller cohorts replace larger ones, so it certainly cannot be said to decrease. Thus option A is the most defensible forecast.

A large youth population creates demand for services used by young people. If participation in higher education is also rising, more students are likely to seek places beyond school, including colleges, universities, and vocational institutions. These students may also need hostels or other student housing, especially where institutions are far from their homes. The exact level of demand depends on enrolment policies, household income, and available institutions, but the direction of demand follows from the two conditions in the question.

Option A is correct because it links a large potential student population with increasing participation in higher education. Primary schools serve younger children and are not the most direct answer to rising higher-education participation. Pensions and geriatric care mainly respond to an older population, not to a large youth group. The word “only” in the other choices makes them especially unsuitable, since demographic planning generally requires several services rather than one isolated facility.

A large elderly population creates care needs, and a weak pension system provides little public income to meet them. Many older people may then depend on relatives for money, housing, medical help, or daily assistance. Working-age family members may need to spend more time caring for them or transfer part of their earnings. This can create financial, emotional, and time pressure within households.

The pressure is not automatically removed by the size of the elderly population, because formal support is limited in the stated situation. It also does not imply that fertility will rise or that the working population will double. Choice A directly connects weak pensions with greater family responsibility for elderly care and support. The other choices describe effects that do not logically follow from an ageing population and inadequate pensions.

The age groups listed in the question together make up the non-working-age share used in this calculation. Children aged 0 to 14 account for 18 percent, and people aged 60 and above account for 17 percent. Their combined share is \(18+17=35\) percent. Since all age groups together equal 100 percent, the remaining working-age share is \(100-35=65\) percent. Therefore option C is correct.

This calculation assumes that the population is divided into only these three broad groups: children, working-age people, and older people. It also treats the categories as non-overlapping, as they normally are in such a percentage question. Option A would leave 45 percent unexplained, while 60 and 75 percent do not follow from subtracting the two dependent groups from the total. The answer is therefore 65 percent.

A growing elderly population can raise spending on pensions, health care, and support services. This creates economic pressure because each worker may need to support more older dependants. However, dependency pressure is not determined only by the number of elderly people. If the working-age population becomes more productive, each worker can produce more goods, services, and income, helping finance these needs.

Thus higher productivity may offset some, but not necessarily all, of the pressure. It cannot make elderly dependency disappear immediately, and it does not automatically reduce the elderly population. Productivity clearly has an economic effect, so option C is wrong. The word “some” in option A is important because the final outcome also depends on employment, wages, taxation, health costs, and pension arrangements.

A large child population creates strong demand for services that protect children’s survival, growth, and development. These services include vaccination, nutrition programmes, maternal and child healthcare, clean water, disease treatment, and accessible primary healthcare. When health services are weak, the system may struggle to meet this demand for a large number of children.

As a result, malnutrition, preventable illness, delayed treatment, and poor child health can become especially important concerns. Elderly pensions and long-term elderly care may also matter in a society, but they are not the most direct pressure described by a large child population. Therefore, the specific problem most closely linked to the two conditions in the question is pressure related to child nutrition and health, making option A correct.

The child share falls from 30% to 22%, a decrease of 8 percentage points. At the same time, the elderly share rises from 10% to 16%, an increase of 6 percentage points. These changes show that the population contains a smaller proportion of children and a larger proportion of older people. The age structure is therefore moving toward ageing.

This pattern is commonly associated with falling fertility and longer survival, although the percentages alone do not prove the exact cause or determine every future trend. It does not mean child dependency is rising; the child share has fallen. Nor does it necessarily prove that fertility is currently rising; in fact, a falling child share often accompanies lower fertility. Therefore, option A is the broad and best-supported conclusion.

The three percentages describe the whole population: 22 percent children, 18 percent elderly people, and 60 percent working-age people. Since 60 percent is the largest share, the working-age group is the main part of the population. However, the 18-percent elderly group is not negligible. It may create meaningful needs for pensions, health care, accessible services, and family support. The 22-percent child group also represents a continuing dependency need. Thus option A gives the most balanced conclusion.

This information does not justify saying that the country is completely youthful or contains only elderly people. Dependence has not disappeared because children and older people together make up 40 percent of the population. A simple dependency ratio, using these broad groups, would be approximately \(40/60\), or about 0.67 dependents per working-age person, though exact definitions can vary. The key point is that the working-age group is largest while elderly dependency remains important.

A large youth population can become an advantage when young people receive education, skills, and suitable jobs. However, if universities, training programmes, and labour-market opportunities are insufficient, many young people may be unable to study further or find stable work. This can produce youth unemployment, underemployment, frustration, and wider social pressure. The risk is especially important when a large cohort enters the labour market at the same time.

Option A identifies this direct consequence. A large youth share does not immediately remove elderly dependency, and pension spending is not the only possible concern. The child population will not necessarily decline immediately either. Effective planning must therefore expand education, skill development, and decent employment rather than treating youth numbers alone as an advantage.

The working-age share depends strongly on the size of different birth cohorts as they move through the age structure. It can first rise when a large group of young people reaches working age and the younger group is relatively smaller. Later, that same large group grows older and leaves the working-age category. If fertility has fallen, the cohorts behind it will be smaller, so fewer young people enter working age to replace those leaving it.

Thus option A is the most likely long-term demographic cause. This pattern is often related to a demographic dividend followed by population ageing, although migration and mortality can also influence the exact timing. Working-age adults do not suddenly become children, and extremely high fertility would usually enlarge future young cohorts rather than explain a later decline in the working-age share. Age structure does change over time.